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BERRY& MURPHY, P.C. V. CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE
CO.: MALPRACTICE LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
American journalist and satirist, Ambrose Bierce, once referred to
insurance as, "[a]n ingenious modem game of chance in which the player
is permitted to enjoy the comfortable conviction that he is beating the
man who keeps the table."' However, as insurance policies become in-
creasingly complex, and new forms of liability insurance are created,
policyholders can no longer feel comfortable with the idea that an insur-
ance policy guarantees them coverage. Instead, "the man who keeps the
table" has the luxury of feeling much more comfortable. In Berry &
Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co.,2 the Tenth Circuit
interpreted a claims-made malpractice liability insurance policy in favor
of Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, resulting in a lack of coverage
for Berry & Murphy, P.C. 4 and a windfall for Carolina Casualty.5 In do-
ing so, the court incorrectly interpreted the term "insured" as defined in
the insurance policy,6 did not adhere to established precedent in Colorado
7law, and created a highly inequitable result. All attorneys covered by a
claims-made malpractice liability insurance policy should take notice of
the holding in Berry & Murphy due to its potentially damaging effects.
Part I of this Comment examines claims-made insurance policies
and how they compare to occurrence policies, the various pitfalls insured
parties face under this relatively recent form of coverage, how the judici-
ary has historically construed insurance policies, and the potential result
of an insurance company's arbitrary refusal to defend or pay a claim.
Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and the court's holding
and analysis in Berry & Murphy. Part III analyzes Berry & Murphy,
commends the court on its determination that the facts constitute a single
claim, criticizes the majority for its interpretation of the term "insured,"
and examines the fallacies and potential negative consequences of the
ruling. This Comment concludes by arguing that claims-made insurance
policies must be written with more precise definitions of key terms, and
that clearly defined precedent dictates favorable outcomes for insured
parties when insurance companies fail to heed such advice.
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 169 (Forum Books 1948) (1911).
2. 586 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter "Berry & Murphy"].
3. Id. at 816.
4. Id. at 815.
5. Id. at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 814-15 (majority opinion).
7. Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Colo. 1993) (noting that ambiguous
contractual provisions should be "construed against the insurer who drafted the policy and in favor
of the insured" (citing Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo. 1990))).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Contrasting Occurrence and Claims-Made Insurance Policies
Historically, "insurance policies have been written on an occurrence
basis, providing coverage for events that take place during the policy
period . . . ."8 Under an occurrence policy, the claim against the insured
can come at any time, essentially providing unlimited prospective cover-
age for events occurring while the policy was in effect.9 As the United
States became more industrialized and insurance claims increased, insur-
ance companies discovered that difficulties with the occurrence model
were quickly arising.' 0 In particular, due to the prospective nature of
these policies, unanticipated lag time between occurrences and filing of
claims created a "tail" in which the insurance companies could not pre-
dict the amount of money they would have to pay out, causing actuarial
estimation problems." For this reason, insurance companies sought to
avoid liability by arguing that events leading to insurance claims did not
take place during the policy period.12 However, the judiciary was willing
to broaden insurers' liability by developing three different theories that
worked in favor of the insured.13 As a result, insurance companies faced
increased business costs,14 which, in turn, were passed on to the in-
sured.' 5 A natural consequence of these increased rates was the insurer's
inability to obtain such rates due to the unwillingness of the insured to
pay a premium that approached the total recovery available.' 6
As insurers began to withdraw from the market due to financial in-
stability,17 carriers realized that a less expensive policy option would be
needed to counteract the rising premiums of occurrence policies.
Claims-made policies began to emerge, and this narrower form of cover-
age began to replace occurrence policies in areas such as professional
liability.' 9 Claims-made policies provide retroactive coverage 20 for
8. See Carolyn M. Frame, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: Closing the Gaps with Ret-
roactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 165, 165 (1987).
9. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 n.3 (citing I LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:5 (3d ed. 1996)).
10. See Frame, supra note 8, at 169-70.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 170.
13. Id. at 170-71 (describing the manifestation theory, exposure theory, and triple trigger
theory).
14. Id. at 171 ("Insurers were faced with inflation rates, escalating jury awards, and the gen-
eral proliferation of claims. These factors increased the insurer's business costs because the premi-
ums paid at the time of the occurrence were not sufficient to create the financial pool required to pay





19. Id. at 177-79 (describing that the proliferation of claims-made policies in the area of
professional liability is due, in pars, to the policy's relative cost and coverage compared to occur-
rence policies).
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claims that are made against the insured and reported during the policy
period. 21 The notable difference between the occurrence policy and
claims-made policy is that under a claims-made policy an insured can be
indemnified for an event that occurred before the policy began, as long
as the event is reported during the policy period.22 Because the insurer's
liability ends on a stated date, insurers are no longer exposed to the un-
certainty of future claims by the insured, thereby allowing the insurers to
calculate premiums with greater accuracy.23
B. Problems Associated With Claims-Made Policies
1. Notice-Prejudice Rule
Due to the strict notice and reporting requirements set forth in
claims-made insurance policies, commentators have suggested that a
more appropriate name for this type of policy should be "claims made
and reported." 24 Because an insured party must become aware of the
event giving rise to the claim and must report the claim within the policy
period, limiting the name of this type of policy to claims-made seems
misleading. The critical requirement of giving notice of a claim to the
insurer within the policy period has led to what is commonly referred to
as the "notice-prejudice" rule.25
This often-overlooked notice requirement 26 has led to litigation in
instances where a claim is made against an insured shortly before the
policy's coverage expired, not leaving a reasonable amount of time to
give notice,27 and in cases where an insured argues that circumstances
made it impractical to give notice to the insurer.28 However, in cases
such as these, courts have been reluctant to add a judicially created "tail"
to the end of a claims-made policy and have instead sided with insurance
companies in showing "prejudice" when the insured fails to report the
claim during the policy period.29 Due to the inherent differences between
occurrence policies and claims-made policies, courts have determined
that the notice provision is an essential element of claims-made policies
20. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 809 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing I Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 1:5).




24. Reed Millsaps, Avoiding the "Nightmares"-The "Notice-Prejudice" Rule and Claims
Made Policies, 28 No. 5 INs. LITIG. REP. 165, 165 (2006).
25. See id.
26. Id
27. E.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. 1983).
28. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 433 (Colo. App.
1991).
29. See, e.g., id. at 435; Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
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and have held that any judicial extension of the policy period would re-
sult in an un-bargained-for extension of coverage.30
In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis,31 the Florida Su-
preme Court noted the stark differences between occurrence and claims-
made policies and cited economic ramifications as the basis for its deci-
sion that insurers must show "prejudice" under a claims-made policy. 3 2
As discussed above, the financial benefit conferred upon the insured in
such a policy is a lower premium for comparable coverage.33 However,
this comes at the cost of a shorter reporting period.34 The court refused to
extend the reporting period beyond the end of the policy because it
viewed this type of coverage as specifically bargained for between the
insurer and the insured. The philosophy of the Dolan court was "widely
followed by other courts[,] 3 6 with some courts extending the economic
analysis beyond premium setting, 3 effectively solidifying the notice-
prejudice rule.
2. Policy Language Ambiguities
Another problem facing claims-made insurance policies leading to
increased litigation is ambiguities in policy language.38 When insurance
companies write policies that lack clear terminology, yet propose to en-
force strict notice and reporting guidelines, the interpretation of whether
or not an insured is covered often become contentious. 39
In California, the word "may," in conjunction with the terms of
when a claim can be set forth, has led to such an ambiguity.40 In Cham-
berlin v. Smith, the California Court of Appeals followed precedent set in
Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co. in determining that the language of the
insurance policy was susceptible to two divergent interpretations. 4 1 The
30. E.g., Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
31. 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983).
32. See id. at 516. In a claims-made policy, unlike an occurrence policy, a claim will not arise
after the expiration of the policy; therefore, due to this reduced underwriting risk, claims-made
policies can be offered at a lower premium than occurrence policies. Id.
33. Millsaps, supra note 24, at 165.
34. Id.
35. Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
36. Millsaps, supra note 24, at 165 (discussing the holdings of Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1994) and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d
432 (Colo. App. 1991) as examples of cases that have followed Dolan).
37. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 435 (Colo. App.
1991) (noting that the ability to accurately fix reserves leads to lower policy premiums); Hasbrouck
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Iowa 1993) (noting that insurer prejudice
allows for more accuracy in setting reserves).
38. See Garmisa, supra note 21, at 294.
39. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Armas, 527 N.E.2d 921, 925 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 514 P.2d 1219, 1220-21 (Cal. 1973); Chamberlin v.
Smith, 140 Cal. Rptr. 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1977).
41. Chamberlin, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98 ("First, the phrase might limit coverage to a claim
asserted within the policy period and exclude claims asserted afterward, making the words 'which
may be' superfluous. Secondly, the phrase might be construed as extending coverage to any claim
446 [Vol. 88:2
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pertinent language of the insurance policy read, "[T]o indemnify ...
against any claim or claims for breach of professional duty as Lawyers
which may be made against them during the period set forth in the Cer-
tificate by reason of any negligent act, error or omission, whenever or
wherever the same was or may have been committed .... The court
dismissed the idea that there was unnecessary language in the policy and
instead adopted a construction that provided coverage for an injury that
took place during the policy period, even when the claim was made sub-
sequent to the policy's expiration.43 In ambiguous situations such as this,
claims-made policies will likely lead to litigation due to the insurer's
unwillingness to indemnify the insured44 and the insured's rightful claim
that ambiguities must be construed in their favor.45
While many insurance companies have eliminated the word "may"
from their policies,46 even "plain language" policies can be encumbered
by ambiguities, leading to disagreements regarding the temporal re-
quirements of notice.47 For example, in St. Paul Insurance Co. of Illinois
v. Armas,48 the Illinois Appellate Court found that the plain language of a
malpractice liability insurance policy, in conjunction with a cancellation
form, resulted in an ambiguity that could conceivably allow an insured
party to report a claim after the expiration of the policy period.49 In this
policy, which lacked a definitional section,5 0 the insured was given no
guidance in determining what constituted a loss-leading the court to
determine that an ambiguity was created as to when a claim had to be
reported.5 1 The court held that the provisions created confusion, resulting
from conflicting terms.52 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's
ruling, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate.5 3 Such ambi-
guities in claims-made policies constitute another worrisome complica-
tion due to the increased potential for litigation and possibility that the
insured will not receive the coverage they thought they had purchased.
which arose and could have been asserted during the policy period, including claims not actually
asserted until after the policy's expiration." (quoting Gyler, 514 P.2d at 1221)).
42. Id. at 497 (second alteration in original).
43. Id. at 502.
44. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
45. See id. at 498 ("The general rule is that if coverage is available under any reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous clause of an insurance policy, the insurer cannot escape its obliga-
tions.").
46. Garmisa, supra note 21, at 294.
47. Id.
48. 527 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
49. See id. at 925.
50. Id. at 924.
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Id. at 925.
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3. Avoidance of Liability
Due to the restrictive nature of claims-made policies, insurers typi-
cally require prospective policyholders to disclose whether they have
knowledge of potential claims against them at the time the policy is insti-
tuted. This attempt by insurance companies to avoid coverage gives rise
to problems regardless of the jurisdiction in which the policy is written
and has been interpreted both in favor of and against insured parties.54
A series of Illinois state cases illustrate the courts' varying interpre-
tations of whether a lack of disclosure on behalf of the insured at the
onset of the claims-made policy is considered misrepresentation. In
Great West Steel Industries v. Northbrook Insurance Co.,56 the court held
that no misrepresentation had taken place when the insured failed to re-
port a construction accident potentially related to steel it had manufac-
tured because it believed it was not responsible for the accident. 5 7 Al-
though the insured party was aware of the circumstances that might lead
to a claim, it did not believe it was at fault and the court construed the
policy language in their favor.58
In the malpractice liability context, courts have not been as forgiv-
ing when policyholders fail to report potential claims at the inception of
the policy.59 For example, in Stiefel v. Illinois Union Insurance Co.,60 an
attorney received a letter informing him of a potential malpractice law-
suit that would be filed against him six months before he took out a
claims-made insurance policy.6' Despite the argument that the attorney
believed the claim had been abandoned, the court did not reach a conclu-
sion consistent with Great West Steel Industries when the insurance
company subsequently denied coverage after a lawsuit was filed against
the insured within the policy period.6 2 Instead, the court explained that
the letter sent to the insured undoubtedly constituted notice of a potential
malpractice suit, regardless of the fact that the lawsuit was not filed when
the plaintiff claimed they would file it.63 In contrast to the holding in
Stiefel, an insurance company's attempt to avoid liability in similar cir-
cumstances was unsuccessful when an insured party denied knowledge
of a potential claim even though they had received a letter similar to that
54. See Garmisa, supra note 21, at 296.
55. Id.; Great W. Steel Indus. v. Northbrook Ins. Co., 484 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
Stiefel v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
56. 484 N.E. 2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
57. Id. at 853.
58. Id.
59. See Stiefel, 542 N.E.2d at 76.
60. 542 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
61. Id. at 74-75.
62. See id. at 77.
63. Id.
[Vol. 88:2448
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64in Stiefel four years before the policy term. This departure from
Stiefel's holding indicates an increased potential for ambiguity in the
interpretation of this temporal aspect of claims-made policy applications,
giving rise to further complications with this type of insurance policy.
C. Insurance Policy Jurisprudence
When a dispute arises between an insurance company and a policy-
holder, Colorado law states that insurance policies should be interpreted
based on the principles of contract law.65 In construing the terms of the
policy, courts must attempt to "promote the intent of the parties" as they
would with any contract.66 As evidenced by a multitude of insurance
litigation, the intent of the parties is not always clear.67 In the insurance
context, courts seek to resolve disagreements about coverage and termi-
nology used in a written instrument by determining intent based on the
plain language of the instrument. 68 When the language is clear and un-
ambiguous, courts should "not rewrite a contractual provision"69 and
must instead "give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of its
terms."70
When the language is unclear, however, and uncertainty arises,
"courts should construe the policy in favor of the insured."7 ' Although a
mere disagreement between the insurance provider and policyholder does
not give rise to an ambiguity, when the policy "is susceptible on its face
to more than one reasonable interpretation" it is determined to be am-
biguous.7 2 Finally, in determining whether a policy is ambiguous on any
point, courts "must evaluate the policy as a whole."73
D. Bad Faith on Part ofInsurer
When an insurance company is held liable for a claim, state statutes
may also allow insured parties to recover reasonable attorney fees, court
64. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Co., 508 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) ("We also recognize that that foreseeability may have been diminished by the intervening time
period between the last correspondence between the parties in April, 1980 and the filing of the
complaint in February 1983. In our view, whether that period of silence lulled Stat-Tab into a false
assurance that there were no prior errors which would give rise to a potential claim, thereby acting as
a waiver of prior knowledge of potential claims, is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes
entry of a summary judgment.").
65. See Carl's Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639 (Colo. App. 2007) (citing
Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo.1990)).
66. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005).
67. See, e.g., Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263
(Cal. 1993); Prof'I Solutions Ins. Co. v. Mohrlang, No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706
(D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009).
68. Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1055 (Colo.
1994)
69. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988).
72. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005).
73. Id.
449
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
costs, and the covered benefits when an insurer's delay or refusal to pay
a claim constitutes bad faith.7 4 In Colorado, a first-party claimant in such
an action may recover two times the covered benefit.75 In the absence of
a bad faith statute, an insured may typically only recover special dam-
ages for the insurance company's refusal to indemnify the loss or the
actual amount due to the insured based on the loss. 7 6
An insurance company's mere denial of a claim does not necessar-
ily rise to the level of bad faith7 7 and, although similar, states differ in the
elements of this cause of action. 7 8 To establish a claim of bad faith in
Colorado the plaintiff must have damages or loss, the defendant must
have denied or delayed payment without reasonable basis for its action,
and the defendant's unreasonable conduct must have been the cause of
the plaintiffs damages or loss. 9 Because such statutes are penal in na-
ture, they are to be strictly construed and the burden is on the insured
seeking statutory recovery to prove arbitrariness or capriciousness on the
part of the insurer for failing to pay a claim.80 Insurance companies have
been held liable for statutory penalties after acting in bad faith in a vari-
ety of circumstances,8 including, among other things, denial of a claim
on the grounds that a particular person was not within the coverage af-
forded by the policy. 82 Illustrating the contentiousness of such litigation,
however, courts have also held to the contrary in cases involving similar
factual circumstances.
II. BERRY& MURPHY, P.C. V. CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
A. Facts
Berry & Murphy, P.C. involves the interpretation of a claims-
made insurance policy issued by Carolina Casualty84 to the named in-
sured "Timothy H. Berry, P.C."85 The issue in this case stems from a
series of disputes beginning with a personal injury lawsuit filed against
Joseph Ciri on behalf of Oksana and William Burkhardt.8 6 Seth Murphy,
a co-shareholder with the law firm of Berry & Murphy, P.C., represented
74. 14 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 207:1 (defining bad faith as "the arbitrary refusal
of an insurance company to pay a valid claim").
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1116(1) (2008).
76. George L. Blum, Annotation, What Constitutes Bad Faith on Part ofInsurer Rendering It
Liable for Statutory Penalty Imposed for Bad Faith in Failure to Pay, or Delay in Paying, Insured's
Claim-Particular Grounds for Denial ofClaim: Risks, Causes, and Extent ofLoss, Injury, Disability,
or Death, 123 A.L.R. 5TH 259 § 2[a] (2004).
77. Id. at § 2[b].
78. See 14 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 207:3.
79. COLO. JURY INSTR., 4TH (CIVIL) § 25:4 (2010).
80. Blum, supra note 76, at § 2[b].
81. Id. at § 2[a].
82. Id. at § 3[a].
83. Id. at § 3[b].
84. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 814.
86. Id. at 805.
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the Burkhardts in this suit (the Ciri Lawsuit)-filed in January 2005 .87
March 2006, Mr. Murphy left Berry & Murphy, P.C., taking the Ciri
Lawsuit with him to his new firm, Richmond, Neiley, Sprouse, & Mur-
phy, LLC." Over the next several months, the court granted a motion to
withdraw as counsel filed by Mr. Murphy and granted, without prejudice,
a motion filed by the defendants to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to
prosecute.8 In November 2006, the court then granted a motion to recon-
sider the order dismissing the Ciri Lawsuit after the Burkhardts hired
Cindy Tester as new counsel. 90 Due to various instances in which Mr.
Murphy failed to comply with Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1,9'
which he did not opt out of, Ms. Tester sent a letter (the Tester Letter) to
Mr. Murphy in January 2007 at his new place of employment informing
him of a malpractice suit she planned to file on behalf of the Burk-
hardts. 92
Of great importance to the case is the fact that the Tester Letter was
sent only to Richmond, Neiley, Sprouse, & Murphy, LLC and not to Mr.
Murphy's former co-shareholder, Timothy H. Berry. 93 Furthermore, Mr.
Murphy followed the advice in the Tester Letter and provided his law
firm's malpractice insurance carrier with notice of the claim. 94 Nearly a
year later, in December 2007, the court granted a renewed motion to
dismiss the Ciri Lawsuit,95 which was followed by a legal malpractice
claim (the Malpractice Lawsuit) filed on behalf of the Burkhardts against
Mr. Murphy and Berry & Murphy, P.C., in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.96 The Malpractice Lawsuit alleged
that Mr. Murphy and Berry & Murphy, P.C. "missed the deadline for
filing notice to elect exclusion from Simplified Procedures pursuant to
[Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure] 16.1 in the Ciri Lawsuit," and that
both were "'negligent' and breached their 'fiduciary duty of loyalty' to
the Burkhardts." 97 On July 23, 2008, Mr. Berry accepted service of the
Malpractice Lawsuit and put Carolina Casualty on notice of the suit the




90. Id. at 806.
91. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.1(a)(1) ("The purpose of [simplified procedure] is to provide maxi-
mum access to the district courts in civil actions; to enhance the provision of just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of civil actions; to provide the earliest practical trials; and to limit discovery
and its attendant expense.").
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Malpractice Lawsuit at the time he was served and was unaware of the
Tester Letter.99
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Berry & Murphy, P.C. and Timothy H. Berry, P.C. filed
suit to resolve a dispute with defendant Carolina Casualty regarding de-
fendant's denial of coverage for the Malpractice Lawsuit.100 Carolina
Casualty denied coverage "on the grounds that the alleged malpractice
claim was first made against an insured (i.e., Seth Murphy) prior to the
inception of the insurance policy (i.e., via the Tester Letter), thereby fal-
ling outside the claims-made coverage of the policy."'oi
The plaintiffs and Carolina Casualty filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment before the district court, which granted Carolina Casu-
alty's motion in its entirety.' 02 The district court based its ruling on the
fact that Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of the insur-
ance policy, that the Tester Letter constituted notice to the insured, and
that the "burden" should not fall on Carolina Casualty for Mr. Murphy's
failure to inform his former partner or firm of the claim.1o3 As the pre-
vailing party, Carolina Casualty was awarded costs.104 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo and applied
the substantive law of Colorado, the forum state.' 05
C The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Briscoe began her analysis by exam-
ining the language of the insurance policy at issue. o0 The claims-made
policy contained the following "Insuring Agreement":
This Policy shall pay on behalf of the Insured all Damages and
Claims Expense that the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay, arising from any Claim first made against an Insured during the
Policy Period and reported to the Insurer in writing during the Policy
Period or within 60 days thereafter, for any Wrongful Act, provided
that prior to the inception date of the first Lawyers' Professional Li-
ability Insurance Policy issued by the Insurer to the Named Insured,
which has been continuously renewed and maintained in effect to the






104. Id. at 807-08.
105. Id. at 808.
106. Id at 808-10.
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not reasonable foresee that such Wrongful Act might reasonably be
expected on the basis of a Claim.107
In analyzing this language and the policy's definitions of the terms
"Claim," 1o "Wrongful Act," 09 "Related Wrongful Act,"'110 and "Notice
of Claim and Multiple Claims,"' Judge Briscoe did not find any ambi-
guity and determined that the terms had "plain and ordinary meanings"
that could be applied to the language of the policy.11 2 Therefore, the ma-
jority found that the two essential inquiries were whether (1) the Tester
Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim'' and (2)
whether Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of the pol-
icy. 114
In deciding whether the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
should be considered as one "claim," the majority began by analyzing the
policy's definition of "related wrongful act."'' To support their position
that the claim in the Tester Letter was not "logically or causally con-
nected" to the claims made in the Malpractice Lawsuit, the plaintiffs
argued that Professional Solutions Insurance Co. v. Mohrlangll6 should
control." 7 In Mohrlang, the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado was faced with a task similar to the one in the current dis-
pute; to determine whether two malpractice claims were "related" by
examining the policy's definition of "related acts or omissions."" 8 Like
107. Id. at 808-09.
108. Id. at 809 ("[A] written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief including, but not
limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration proceeding .... A Claim shall be deemed to
have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is first received by any Insured." (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
109. Id. ("[A]ny actual or alleged act, omission, or Personal Injury arising out of Professional
Services rendered by an Insured or by any person for whose act or omission the Insured is legally
responsible .. . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. Id. ("Wrongful Acts which are logically or causally connected by reason of any common
fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, casualty, event or decision." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
111. Id. at 809-10 (stating in pertinent part: "(A) As a condition precedent to their rights under
this Policy, an Insured shall give the Insurer written notice of any Claim as soon as practicable ....
(C) All Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Acts or any Related Wrongful Acts,
or one or more series of similar, repeated or continuous Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful Acts,
shall be considered a single Claim. Each Claim shall be deemed to be first made at the earliest of the
following times: 1. when the earliest Claim arising out of such Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful
Acts is first made").
112. Id. at 810 (citing Carey v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005)
("An insurance policy is ambiguous if it is susceptible on its face to more than one reasonable inter-
pretation . . . . A mere disagreement between the parties concerning interpretation of the policy does
not create an ambiguity. To determine whether a policy contains an ambiguity, we must evaluate the
policy as a whole." (internal citations omitted))).
113. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 810.
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id.at810-11.
116. No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009).
117. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 811-12.
118. Mohrlang, 2009 WL 321706, at *3 (defining "related acts or omissions" as "all acts or
omissions in the rendering of professional services that are temporally, logically or causally con-
nected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision").
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the Tenth Circuit in the current case, the Mohrlang court found no ambi-
guity in the policy's terms." 9 The district court found that the claim
against the attorney for breach of professional duties involving the sale
of stock 20 and the second claim for breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty,
disclosure, and candor involving the release of promissory notesl21 were
not temporally, logically, or causally connected and were not related
claims under the language of the policy.122
Refusing to adopt the result from Mohrlang, the majority distin-
guished the facts in the current case by using the district court's defini-
tion of "logically connected." 2 3 Because the Tester Letter faulted Mr.
Murphy for not opting out of Rule 16.1 and the Malpractice Lawsuit
"flows from Murphy's decision to proceed under Rule 16.1[,]" the court
found the two claims logically connected.124
Both the plaintiffs and Carolina Casualty then discussed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case, Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Law-
y ' CO.125yers' Mutual Insurance Co., which examined insurance policy term
definitions specific to a "claims-based" legal liability policy.12 6 The two
alleged claims of malpractice in this case were an attorney's failure to
serve a stop notice on a construction project's lenders and a failure to
timely foreclose on a mechanic's lien.12 7 Although it was argued that
these were two separate claims, both warranting indemnification,128 the
California Supreme Court disagreed and treated them as a single
claim.129 Carolina Casualty argued that the reasoning employed in Bay
Cities is applicable to the facts at hand and that the Tenth Circuit should
reach a similar result.13 0 The majority agreed with Carolina Casualty,
stating that "it seems logical" to connect multiple acts of malpractice as
"related" in this instance because a single client, the Burkhardts, suffered
a single injury from a single attorney. 131
The final argument made by Carolina Casualty regarding whether
the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim in-
volved a Florida District Court of Appeals case in which "[t]he alleged
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *13.
123. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co, 586 F.3d 803, 812 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Mohrlang, 2009 WL 321706, at *1l (defining "logically connected" as "connected by an inevitable
or predictable interrelation or sequence of events")).
124. Id.
125. 855 P.2d 1263 (Cal. 1993).
126. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 812.
127. Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1264.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. Id. at 1266 ("[W]hen, as in this case, a single client seeks to recover from a single attomey
alleged damages based on a single debt collection matter for which the attorney was retained-there is
a single claim under the attorney's professional liability insurance policy.").
130. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813.
131. See id.
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acts of malpractice were the attorney's failure to name a hospital and
each individual physician from that hospital as defendants in a medical
malpractice lawsuit."' 32 Despite the defendant's assertion that his attor-
ney's failure to join several defendants is akin to multiple wrongful acts,
and therefore multiple claims, the court held otherwise. Using reason-
ing similar to Bay Cities, the court in Eagle American Insurance Co. v.
Nicholsl34 found that all of the attorney's acts of negligence led to a sin-
gle injury on the part of the plaintiff.135 Based on the arguments pre-
sented by Carolina Casualty and consideration of the Bay Cities and
Nichols cases, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Tester Letter and the
Malpractice Lawsuit alleged "related wrongful acts" under the insurance
policy and were therefore one "claim" for indemnification purposes. 136
With the "single claim" dispute resolved, the court turned its atten-
tion to whether Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the terms of the in-
surance policy.137 The term "insured" had five distinct definitions within
the policy, with the pertinent definition stating that "insured" means,
"any individual or professional corporation who was a partner, officer,
director, stockholder, or employee of the Named Insured or Predecessor
Firm, but solely while acting within the scope of their duties on behalf of
the Named Insured or Predecessor Firm . . . ."138 Again, finding no am-
biguity in the policy language, the court proceeded to analyze the lan-
guage of this definition in two parts.' 3 9
The first limitation the definition required was that the individual
"was a partner, officer, director, stockholder, or employee" of the named
insured.140 The court held it "undisputed" that Mr. Murphy was a co-
shareholder in Murphy & Berry, P.C. and that he therefore fit this first
requirement. 141
The second limitation on the definition of "insured" was a much
more crucial determination for the court to make and effectively became
the decisive interpretation in this case.142 In the court's analysis of the
language, "but solely while acting ... on behalf of the Named Insured,"
it stated:
This clause, when read in context with the rest of this definitional
subsection, cannot mean that an individual is an insured only while
132. Id. (citing Eagle Am. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 814 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002)).
133. Nichols, 814 So. 2d at 1085-87.
134. 814 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
135. Id. at 1087.
136. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 814-15.
140. Id. at 814.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 815.
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acting on behalf of the named insured, but must mean that an indi-
vidual is an insured only if the claim being made is related to that in-
dividual's duties on behalf of the named insured. Otherwise, no for-
mer employee of the named insured could ever be an "insured." If
"insured" were interpreted to mean that an individual was an insured
only while acting within the scope of business of the named insured,
it would be paradoxical to define "insured" to include former em-
ployees-any individual "who was a partner, officer, director, stock-
holder, or employee of the Named Insured," Timothy H. Berry,
P.C.143
The court then explained what it believed to be a "better" view of
the definition of insured as including "an individual after he has left the
law firm if the claim involves that individual's acts or omissions that
occurred while at the law firm."l44 Because Mr. Murphy was an "in-
sured" under the court's view of the definition and notice of the "claim"
was given to Mr. Murphy as an insured before the policy period com-
menced, the court held that Carolina Casualty was under no duty to de-
fend or indemnify the plaintiffs. 145 Without a duty to defend or indemnify
a claim, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim failed and affirmed the
judgment of the district court.146
D. The Dissent
Dissenting, Judge Lucero crafted a strongly worded response to the
majority, arguing that, by denying Mr. Berry "the very coverage for
which he paid premiums," Carolina Casualty received a windfall.147 By
redefining "notice" Judge Lucero asserted that the majority created an
"escape hatch" for insurers, allowing them to promise coverage and col-
lect premiums, yet avoid responsibility by failing to uphold their end of
the insurance agreement and refusing to indemnify the insured.148
The focus of the dissenting opinion centered on the interpretation of
the term "insured" and, ultimately, whether notice was given to an in-
sured during the policy period.149 Through the dissection, and piecing
back together, of the policy's definition of insured, Judge Lucero inter-
preted the term in a more straightforward manner. By extracting the su-
perfluous language unrelated to the facts in the current dispute, he found
a better reading to be, "An individual . . . who was a . .. stockholder of
the . . . Predecessor Firm is an insured, but solely while acting within the
scope of their duties on behalf of the . . . Predecessor Firm."150 Based on
143. Id at 814-15.
144. Id at 815.
145. Id
146. Id.
147. Id. at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 818 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the dissent's reading of Colorado's caselaw related to contract interpreta-
tion,15' and careful evaluation of the definition of "insured" in the policy,
Judge Lucero argued that Mr. Murphy was not an insured when he re-
ceived notice of the Burkhardts' claim through the Tester Letter.152
By applying "the plain and ordinary meaning of [the definition's]
terms," 53 the dissent determined that a former employee, or stockholder
in this instance, of a predecessor firm is not an insured when acting out-
side the scope of his duties on behalf of the firm. 15 4 In this instance, Mr.
Murphy was no longer working for Berry & Murphy, P.C. when he re-
ceived the Tester Letter, cannot be said to have been working on behalf
of Berry & Murphy, P.C. at that time, and was therefore not an insured
when notice was given to him.iss
Continuing with its plain language interpretation of "insured," the
dissent directly refuted the majority's obscuring of the definition.' 5 6 In
response to the majority's "paradoxical" argument,157 Judge Lucero ar-
gued that interpreting the definition according to the words' plain mean-
ing did not render it meaningless but instead made it consistent with what
one might expect: that it is unlikely that a former stockholder can receive
notice of a claim.15 After outlining instances in which a former stock-
holder can receive notice sufficient to fulfill the requirement of a
claim,159 Judge Lucero reiterated the majority's careless disregard of
Colorado caselaw.160
151. Id. at 817 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stein, 940 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1997)
(stating that Colorado courts construe insurance policies "to promote the intent of the parties");
Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1055 (Colo. 1994)
("Where there is a written instrument, the intent of the parties is determined from the plain language
of the instrument itself."); Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo.
1992) (stating that courts should "not rewrite a contractual provision that is clear and unambiguous,
but must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms"); Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan,
753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988) ("However, where there is ambiguity or uncertainty as to coverage,
courts should construe the policy in favor of the insured.")).
152. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (citing Wota, 831 P.2d at 1309).
154. Id. at 818.
155. Id.
156. Id at 816 ("In construing the policy's definition of 'Insured,' the majority opinion misap-
plies Colorado law. At a minimum, that definition is ambiguous as to whether a former stockholder
is an insured for notice purposes.").
157. Id. at 815 (majority opinion) ("[I]t would be paradoxical to define 'insured' to include
former employees .... ).
158. See id. at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
159. Id. ("Only if it is established that a former stockholder has given notice in fact to his
previous employer may an issue of notice in this context be properly raised.. . . An individual can be
both a former stockholder and acting on behalf of her former law firm in certain circumstances. An
individual might semi-retire from the practice of law and renounce stockholder status, but take
occasional cases on behalf of her former firm on a contract basis.").
160. Id. at 819 (citing Pub. Serv. Co. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 931 (Colo. 1999) (con-
struing policy language in favor of the insured when it is "susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation")).
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In its conclusion, the dissent stated its belief that Mr. Murphy was
not an insured at the time he received the Tester Letter, and that the
claim was instead first made against an insured when Mr. Berry accepted
service of the Burkhardts' complaint. 16 1 Because Mr. Berry accepted
service on July 23, 2008, the claim was made within the policy period
and the dissent would therefore reverse the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Carolina Casualty.16 2
III. ANALYSIS
In Berry & Murphy, P.C., the Tenth Circuit properly interpreted es-
tablished precedent in determining that the Tester Letter and Malpractice
Lawsuit constituted a single claim, but the majority's interpretation of
the term "insured" resulted in a holding that was not only inequitable, but
one that could have potentially hazardous effects. By defining the term
"insured" to include former employees in instances where the claim in-
volves his acts or omissions while working at his former law firm, the
court disregarded Colorado insurance jurisprudence, which, if followed,
would have led to a different outcome. The Tenth Circuit has also given
such individuals powerful discretion when receiving notice of a claim,
leading to potentially damaging effects.
A. Interpretation of "Related Wrongful Acts"
Although not explicitly stated, the court's first determination of
whether the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted related
wrongful acts was paramount.163 Had the court reached the opposite con-
clusion it is almost certain that the Tenth Circuit would have had to re-
verse the district court's ruling. If the majority had determined that these
were separate claims and adopted the appellant's arguments,164 the
court's subsequent analysis would have proceeded much differently by
analyzing whether Mr. Berry, not Mr. Murphy, was an insured. Mr.
Berry would therefore likely be entitled to coverage because the dispute
over the term "insured" involved Mr. Murphy's status due to the court's
finding that the Tester Letter constituted the first claim against the in-
sured. 165
Instead, the majority devoted the bulk of its opinion to carefully
analyzing the arguments on both sides of the issue and interpreting the
authority used by both Mr. Berry and Carolina Casualty.' 66 Throughout
161. Id. at 819.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 810 (majority opinion) (stating that the first determination to be made is whether the
Tester Letter and Malpractice suits are considered one claim, and failing to discuss the ramifications
if they are determined not to be related wrongful acts).
164. Brief for Appellant at 21-24, Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d
803 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1004), 2009 WL 1064884.
165. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814.
166. Id. at 810-14.
458 [Vol. 88:2
2011] BERRY& MURPHY V CAROLINA CASUALTYINS.
its discussion of these proffered cases, the Tenth Circuit chose not to
restate or directly comment on the appellant's arguments and instead
opted for a streamlined analysis that simply related the law and previous
holdings to the facts at hand.16 7 In finding the Tester Letter and Malprac-
tice Lawsuit to constitute "related wrongful acts[,]" the court correctly
interpreted Mohrlang and Bay Cities,168 while refusing to accept the ap-
pellant's coherent but ultimately misguided arguments.
1. The Mohrlang Decision
In focusing on Mohrlang's recitation of the clear definitions set
forth in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary of "logically con-
nected"170 and "causally connected"'71 the majority properly distin-
guished Mr. Berry's argument. Because insurance contract cases are so
fact-specific, and policies are written in vastly different ways, the court's
reliance on the definitions set forth in Mohrlang allowed for a well-
reasoned decision on this point.17 2 Mr. Berry's argument that the Tester
Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit were not logically connected because the
failure to file disclosures was not a "predictable result" of proceeding
under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1 fell flat due to the appel-
lant's misinterpretation of the definition of the term.' 73 The court's
search for a "predictable interrelation" rather than a "predictable result"
is a more faithful reading of the definition and one that is certainly found
in this instance. While Rule 16.1 adheres in principle to the disclosure
guidelines of Rule 26,174 Rule 16.1 also sets forth strict disclosure dead-
lines.17 5 By failing to opt out of Rule 16.1, Mr. Murphy subjected himself
to the timeframes dictated by the rule. Although failing to fulfill these
requirements may not be a "result" of proceeding under Rule 16.1, as
Mr. Murphy may have failed to make disclosures regardless of his course
of action, this shortcoming is certainly "interrelated" to Rule 16.1 due to
its setting of disclosure deadlines. 76
167. Id. at 811-14.
168. Id.
169. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 21-24.
170. Prof" Solutinns Ins_ Co- v- Mobriang, No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706, at
*11 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009) (defining "logically connected" as "connected by an inevitable or
predictable interrelation or sequence of events").
171. Id. (defining "casually connected" as "connected where one person or thing brings about
the other").
172. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 812 (using the definitions of the terms "logically connected"
and "causally connected" only in relation to the facts at hand).
173. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 22.
174. COLO. R. Civ. P. 16.1 (k)(2) (stating that certain provisions of Rule 26 apply to disclosure
of expert witnesses).
175. Id. ("Written disclosures of experts shall be served by parties asserting claims 90 days
before trial; by parties defending against claims 60 days before trial; and parties asserting claims
shall serve written disclosures for any rebuttal experts 35 days before trial.").
176. Id.
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The court's failure to address the "causally connected" argument set
forth by the appellant likely stems from the fact that such an analysis was
unnecessary. 17 7 If the Tenth Circuit had applied the Mohrlang court's
definition, it would have been difficult to find a causal connection be-
tween the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit. Any causal connection
that may have existed between proceeding under Rule 16.1, as cited in
the Malpractice Lawsuit, and Mr. Murphy's failure to make adequate
disclosures, as mentioned in the Tester Letter, was certainly broken by a
deliberate choice not to comply with the rule.'78 However, due to the
operative word, "or" in the definition of "related wrongful acts" the
court's determination that the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
were logically connected was sufficient to end this inquiry.' 79
2. The Bay Cities Decision
In an apparent attempt to add weight to its decision that only one
claim had been made, the Tenth Circuit discussed a California Supreme
Court case that was also construed in favor of Carolina Casualty.180 The
appellant's argument that "the Tester Letter and the Malpractice Lawsuit
did not arise from the same underlying cause"i81 did not persuade the
court to find multiple claims because of the straightforward language
used in Bay Cities.182 An attempt to argue that the results of Mr. Mur-
phy's failures as set forth in the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
were differentl83 was clearly out of line with the reasoning of the Bay
Cities' court. 184 On this point, the appellant relied on the fact that the
claim in the Tester Letter cites dismissal of the Ciri Lawsuit, and the
Malpractice Lawsuit cites malpractice that did not lead to dismissal of
the Ciri Lawsuit.'8 However, as the majority properly pointed out, the
circumstances here included a single client, a single attorney, and a sin-
gle claim for which Mr. Murphy was retained. 186 Regarding the result, it
is also true that the Burkhardts suffered a single harm.187 Again, the
Tenth Circuit correctly applied persuasive authority despite the refusal to
directly comment on the appellant's argument.
177. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 (defining "related wrongful acts" as logically or caus-
ally connected).
178. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 19-21.
179. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 (defining "related wrongful acts" as logically or caus-
ally connected).
180. Id. at 812-13.
181. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 28.
182. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813 (discussing Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Law-
yers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1275 (Cal. 1993)).
183. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 27-28.
184. See Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1266.
185. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 27-29.
186. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813.
187. Id. (agreeing that the single harm which the Burkhardts suffered was "the lost opportunity
to recover some or all of their damages in the Ciri Lawsuit").
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B. Interpretation of "Insured"
One difficulty faced by the court, and one potential reason for the
stark difference between the majority and dissent's interpretations of the
term "insured," is that the term's definition varies greatly depending on
the type of insurance policy in which it is used.188 To make matters more
difficult, Colorado case law does not set forth a standard definition of
"insured" as used in a malpractice liability insurance policy, which is
likely due to the variable nature of insurance policies.189 Additionally, the
Colorado Revised Statutes do not provide any guidance because the term
"insured" is omitted from the definitions section of Title 10, Insurance.190
While "insurer" is defined,191 along with twenty-seven other terms and
phrases, the Colorado Legislature did not include a standard definition
for "insured."1 92
Faced with these uncertainties, the majority proceeded to improp-
erly craft a definition of this key term. While the Tenth Circuit should be
commended for its threshold determination that the Tester Letter and
Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim, it should not be similarly
lauded for its interpretation of the term "insured." After deciding that the
Tester Letter constituted the initial claim, the appellant's right to indem-
nification hinged on whether Mr. Murphy was considered an insured
under the language of the policy at the time he received the letter. In de-
ciding that Mr. Murphy was in fact an insured, the majority created a
class of insured individuals that was likely not anticipated by the appel-
lant at the inception of the insurance policy.
1. The Majority's Definition
Mr. Murphy received the Tester Letter prior to the commencement
of the insurance policy at issue.193 Therefore, under the conditions of the
claims-made agreement, Mr. Murphy's judicially created status as an
insured caused the claim to be made outside the policy period,194 fore-
closing Berry & Murphy, P.C. from receiving indemnification.'9 5 In the
majority's brief discussion of this important issue, the Tenth Circuit's
188. JOHN W. GRUND, J. KENT MILLER & GRADEN P. JACKSON, 7A COLO. PRAC., PERSONAL
INJURY TORTS AND INSURANCE § 47.5 (2d ed. 2010).
189. See generally id.
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-1-102 (2006).
191. Id. ("'Insurer' means every person engaged as principal, indemnitor, surety, or contractor
in the business of making contracts of insurance.").
192. See id.
193. See Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Insur. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 805-07 (10th Cir.
2009).
194. Id. at 806-07. By determining that Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of
the claims-made policy effective from February 6, 2008 to February 6, 2009, the court foreclosed
Berry & Murphy, P.C.'s opportunity to report a claim during the policy period because Mr. Murphy
had received the Tester Letter on January 10, 2007, constituting notice of the Malpractice Lawsuit.
Because this notice came before the inception of the claims-made policy, the claim was not made
during the policy period and Carolina Casualty avoided liability.
195. Id. at 815.
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decision turns a blind eye to Colorado precedent and distorts the lan-
guage of the insurance policy to fit the Court's ideals.
The majority begins its analysis of this topic by determining that
there is no ambiguity in the policy's definition of insured.19 6 However,
after a short discussion of the definition's third subsection and its limita-
tions, the court states what it believes to be a "better" view of the term
"insured."' 9 7 What the court appears to have done is rewrite the policy's
definition. Colorado insurance law explicitly states that courts should
"not rewrite a contractual provision that is clear and unambiguous,"' 9 8 a
point of law that the Tenth Circuit did not follow. In the majority's at-
tempt to avoid calling the language ambiguous, which would have led to
the court necessarily having to construe the policy in favor of the in-
sured,199 it instead implicitly decided there was an ambiguity by not only
rewriting the language but by acknowledging that it is susceptible to
more than one reading.2oo Through making these two points in its hold-
ing, the court creates a definition that is neither based on the clarity of
the policy language, nor construed in favor of the insured. Instead, the
court created a definition that protects Carolina Casualty and all other
malpractice insurance policy providers from defending and indemnifying
insured parties when a former employee receives notice of a claim.
2. The Dissent's Definition
In response to the majority's reading that was "wholly unmoored
from the text of the policy and violates Colorado jurisprudence regarding
insurance contract interpretation,"2 01 the dissent proposed a reading of
"insured" that is perfectly in-line with the policy's language.2 02 Due to a
lack of technical or specialized meaning in the words of the definition,
the dissent agreed that "the plain and ordinary meaning" of the words
should be adopted.203 In determining that Mr. Murphy was not an insured
204at the time he received the Tester Letter, the dissent made a proper
determination without having to side-step Colorado law.205 The dissent's
196. Id. at 814.
197. Id. at 815 ("In our opinion, the better view is that 'insured' is defined to include an indi-
vidual after he has left the law firm if the claim involves that individual's acts or omissions that
occurred while at the law firm.").
198. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992).
199. Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988).
200. See Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 815 n.6. Although the court reiterates the belief that the
language is clear and unambiguous, it proceeds to rebut the dissent's opinion that the majority is
misapplying the term "insured" in various situations. Id.
201. Id. at 817 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 818.
203. Id. (quoting Wota, 831 P.2d at 1309) (intemal quotation marks omitted).
204. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting) ("Murphy is an insured for the
purposes of certain acts (acts committed within the scope of his duties on behalf of his former firm)
but not others (acts committed outside the scope of his duties). There is no dispute that Murphy was
not acting on behalf of Berry & Murphy, P.C. when he received the Tester Letter, thus notice to him
was not notice to an insured.").
205. See id. (determining that Mr. Murphy was not an insured).
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clear logic206 not only serves the best interest of public policy, it is also in
line with Colorado insurance and contract jurisprudence.207
3. Additional Jurisprudence
Because insurance policies take on many forms, determining who is
an "insured" under individual policies requires careful interpretation of
the policy language. Typically, those named on the declarations page are
considered "named insured" and coverage is extended to those individu-
als and entities.2 08 However, beyond those qualified as named insured,
discrepancies begin to arise when determining whom the policy cov-
ers. 209 In Berry & Murphy, the Tenth Circuit was not faced with a par-
ticularly unique challenge but nonetheless could have used decisions
from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey as
210guidance.21
In Jolley v. Marquess,211 the New Jersey Appellate Court was also
faced with the task of interpreting the definition of "insured" in a claims-
made malpractice liability policy, albeit under a set of circumstances
distinguishable from Berry & Murphy.212 In Jolley, Marquess was a for-
mer partner and employee of the law firm Marquess, Morrison, and
Trimble, P.A. (MMT).213 After leaving MMT, Marquess retained his title
of "senior trial attorney" with MMT and continued to represent one of
214his former firm's clients on an insurance matter. When a malpractice
lawsuit was filed against Marquess, MMT's insurance carrier, Zurich,
206. Id. ("According to the majority, 'but solely while acting within the scope of their duties on
behalf of a predecessor firm 'cannot mean that an individual is an insured only while acting on
behalf of a predecessor firm. Yet that is precisely how 'Insured' is defined in the policy.").
207. See Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992) ("An
insurance policy is a contract and should be construed in accordance with general principles of
contractual interpretation."); Heller v. Fire Ins. Exch., 800 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Colo. 1990) ("To ascer-
tain whether certain provisions of an agreement are ambiguous, the language used must be examined
and construed in harmony with the plain, popular, and generally accepted meaning of the words
employed and with reference to all provisions of the document."); Terranova v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1990) ("In the absence of an ambiguity, an insurance policy
must be given effect according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms."); Urtado v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 528 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1974) ("Considering the contract as a whole, we cannot say that it
is ambiguous. Since it is not, this court may not rewrite it nor limit its effect by strained construc-
tion.").
208. John M. Palmeri & Franz Hardy, Protecting Your Law Practice: Malpractice Insurance
Basics, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 45, 46.
209. See Jolley v. Marquess, 923 A.2d 264, 271 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (interpreting
whether or not a former employee is an insured); See also London, Anderson & Hoeft, Ltd. v. Minn.
Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that only
named lawyers could be held liable for deductable).
210. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 264.
211. 923 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007).
212. Id. at 271.
213. Id. at 267.
214. Id. at 268. The distinguishing fact that Marquess retained his title of "senior trial attorney"
does not defeat the fact that the New Jersey Appellate Court was faced with a nearly identical task as
the 10th Circuit of interpreting the word "insured" in a claims-made malpractice liability insurance
policy. Id.
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denied coverage arguing that Marquess was not a named insured at the
time any alleged malpractice may have occurred.2 15 The Jolley court then
had to determine if Marquess fit the definition of insured as stated in the
policy.21
6
In determining that Marquess was in fact an insured,2 17 the Jolley
court analyzed policy language nearly identical to that in Berry & Mur-
phy.218 The provision at issue read, "[t]he unqualified word 'insured',
whenever used in this policy means: ... (d) any former partner, officer,
director, or stockholder employee of the firm or predecessor firms named
in the Declaration while acting solely in a professional capacity on behalf
of such firms." 219 This is strikingly similar to the language in Berry &
Murphy, with the greatest difference being the substitution of "within the
scope of their duties" in the Carolina Casualty policy 2 20 for "solely in a
professional capacity" in the Zurich policy.221
The Jolley court, unlike the majority in Berry & Murphy, deter-
mined that this subsection of the definition was ambiguous and focused
on construing it in "conformity [with] public policy and principles of
fairness."222 With these principles in mind, the Jolley court construed the
policy language in favor of Marquess-and to the detriment of the insur-
ance company. 223 Stating that subsection (d) was limited to those former
employees who are "representing a party who remains a client of the
insured firm," 224 the Jolley court made a ruling that was favorable to the
insured in this case and that should have provided guidance to the Tenth
Circuit in its attempt to interpret the policy language.
First, this seemingly plain language was determined to be suscepti-
ble to multiple interpretations,225 just as the policy language in Berry &
Murphy could have been determined to be ambiguous.226 Had Berry &
Murphy decided that the language was ambiguous in the same manner,
established precedent may have forced a substantially different outcome.
215. Id. at 269. While the argument in this case is opposite that of the argument in Berry &
Murphy, in that the insurance company in Jolley is arguing that Marquess is not an insured, the fact
still remains that both the New Jersey Appellate Court and the 10th Circuit were faced with nearly
identical tasks in interpreting the term "insured" in claims-made malpractice liability insurance
policies. Id.
216. Id. at 271.
217. Id. at 272-73.
218. See id. at 270-71.
219. Id. (emphasis omitted).
220. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 814 (10th Cir. 2009).
221. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 271.
222. Id. at 272 (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J.
1992)).
223. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 273.
224. Id. at 272.
225. See id
226. See Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 816-19 (10th Cir.
2009) (Lucero, J., dissenting). Multiple interpretations are evidenced by the fact that the dissent's
interpretation deviated greatly from the majority. Id
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Second, the definition employed by the Jolley court could have guided
the court in Berry & Murphy. If the majority interpreted the definition of
insured in a similar manner to Jolley when it ruled that acting "solely in a
professional capacity on behalf of such firms" is limited to instances
where a former attorney is representing a party who remains a client of
the insured firm,227 Mr. Murphy surely would not have been considered
an insured.
C. Practical Effects of Holding
By creating a class of insured individuals who are no longer part-
ners or employees of a law firm, yet are still considered "insured" when
they receive a claim based on acts or omissions that took place while
employed at their former law firm, 228 the Tenth Circuit has created a
situation in which law firms may not receive coverage for the premiums
they are paying.229 Based on this holding, the Tenth Circuit has devel-
oped disturbing precedent with potentially severe consequences for law-
yers, law firms, and insurance companies alike. In the wake of this deci-
sion a potentially hazardous set of circumstances may arise when former
employees are faced with the discretion to notify their former employer
of a potential or actual claim.
In light of this holding, law firms are now at the mercy of their for-
mer employees when an injured client sends notice of a potential mal-
practice claim directly to the attorney who is being accused of malprac-
tice, rather than to the law firm itself. As was seen in Berry & Murphy,
the former employee is then faced with the sole decision of whether or
not to tell his former law firm about the claim. Even when the former
employee heeds the advice of the client and informs his insurance carrier
of the potential lawsuit, the former law firm remains in great danger of
230 weeabeing denied coverage. In cases where an employee was fired from his
position as an attorney, or decided to leave his law firm as a result of a
bad business relationship with his employer, the Tenth Circuit now gives
these individuals the power to vindictively withhold knowledge of a
claim with the intention of financially damaging his former employer. By
simply taking out an individual malpractice liability insurance policy
upon leaving a law firm, former employees are able to rest assured that
they will be covered in the event a claim is made against them but will
also be able to take comfort in the idea that withholding information of a
claim against their former employer will not affect them as an individual.
227. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 272.
228. See Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814-15.
229. Id at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
230. Although Mr. Murphy took the advice of the Tester Letter and put his malpractice insur-
ance carrier on notice, Carolina Casualty nonetheless escaped liability. See id.
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1. Curing the Effects
One possible remedy to this unfortunate outcome would be for
courts to employ an "impossibility" doctrine in claims-made insurance
policies. In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis,2 3 1 the Florida
Supreme Court noted that "if an impossibility prevented notice being
given to an insurer at the very end of the policy period, it may well be
that an insured would be relieved of giving notice during the period of
such impossibility." 232 Although that issue was not before the court, it
held the possibility open for future cases. 2 33 It would certainly be in the
best interest of insured parties if courts were to recognize the impossibil-
ity doctrine when a law firm does not receive notice of a claim within a
policy period because notice was first given to a former employee. When
situations such as this arise, courts could then look to when the insured
law firm, rather than the former employee, received notice of the claim
when determining whether a claim was made within the policy period.
This recognition of impossibility would be in line with the idea set forth
by the Florida Supreme Court but would extend to claims made before
the policy period began, rather than notice given after the policy period
expired.
An additional approach that can be taken to cure the outcome of
Berry & Murphy is legislative intervention. In Colorado, claims-made
insurance policies are subject to regulation by the Insurance Commis-
sioner under Colorado Revised Statute § 10-4-419, Claims-made policy
forms.234 Within this statute, mandatory disclosures and alerts to the in-
sured are set forth, including the following:
(A) A description of the principal benefits and coverage provided in
the policy;
(B) A statement of the exceptions, reductions, and limitations con-
tained in the policy;
(C) A statement of the renewal provisions including any reservation
by the insurer of a right to change premiums;
(D) A statement that the outline of coverage is a summary of the pol-
icy issued or applied for and that the policy should be consulted to
determine governing contractual provisions. 235
Beyond these disclosures, § 10-4-419 requires that the policy in-
clude numerous additional definitions and provisions and governs vari-
231. 433 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1983).
232. Id. at 515 n.1.
233. Id.
234. COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-419 (2010).
235. Id.
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ous other aspects of claims-made policies. 236 The term "insured," how-
ever, is not set forth in this statute, and insurers are not required to meet
any statutory guidelines or follow any regulations when defining this
important term in insurance policies. 237 An amendment to this statute
requiring clear, unambiguous definitions of key terms such as "insured,"
and a requirement that such definitions be submitted and reviewed by the
Insurance Commissioner would undoubtedly be in the best interest of
public policy because such requirements would reduce or even eliminate
the risk of litigation. While it may be impractical to list every person
covered by the insurance policy as a named insured, all parties involved
would benefit from a clearer understanding of exactly who is covered
through the use of straightforward explanations of troublesome terms.
A final recommendation for curing the effects of this ruling is for
lawyers and law firms to take a proactive approach with their insurance
policies. Because the changing structure of a law firm has the ability to
negatively impact insurance coverage, 238 partners and stockholders
should inform their insurance company when attorneys are no longer
employed with the firm. This simple step of informing an insurance
company, or inquiring about potential ramifications, can put the carrier
on notice that an employee is no longer a member of the firm, and the
insured law firm can be confident that former employees who receive
notices of claims will have no bearing over their malpractice insurance
coverage.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., the Tenth
Circuit properly construed the insurance policy's definition of "related
wrongful acts" but improperly rewrote the definition of "insured" to fit
the court's ideals. In doing so, the court failed to follow established
Colorado precedent in its analysis and created a class of insured indi-
viduals who now carry a dangerous amount of discretion. All attorneys
carrying malpractice liability insurance should understand the potential
consequences of this ruling, and the judiciary and legislature should be-
gin to take notice of alternative measures that can be taken to cure this
inequitable result. It seems clear that when a court rewrites the definition
of a term within an insurance policy, an ambiguity has arisen, and the
beneficiary of such an ambiguity should be the insured.
236. Id. (including, but not limited to, definitions of events and conditions which trigger cover-
age, a provision that guarantees the ability to purchase an extended reporting period upon cancella-
tion or nonrenewal, and mandatory submission of new claims-made policy forms to the Insurance
Commissioner before such forms are used).
237. See id.
238. See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J.
LEGAL PROF. 41, 55 (2004).
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